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INTRODUCTION
Nielsen misperceives the argument advanced by DCH on appeal or
mischaracterizes that argument. DCH is not complaining about the trial court's
evidentiary rulings or its factual findings. Rather, DCH is asserting that the trial court
erred when it resorted to extrinsic evidence, which was admittedly of record, in reaching a
legal conclusion concerning the proper interpretation of the parties' agreement. As the
proper interpretation of the parties' contract was, in essence, the sole issue in the court
below, it is pointless to assert that the issue wasn't preserved below. That issue was
framed by the complaint and expressly tried to the court. Nielsen's argument to the
contrary is borne of a desire not to have the case heard on the merits.
In point of fact, DCH argued below that Nielsen unambiguously agreed, in an
integrated contract, to convey good and marketable title to DCH and that his undisputed
failure to do so was a manifest breach of contract. (R. 345, Trans, at p. 160.) There can
be no serious argument that the sole issue raised on appeal and the sole issue tried below
was not preserved for appeal.
With regard to Nielsen's complaint that DCH failed to marshal evidence, DCH has
no such burden. "[T]he marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual
findings, not to conclusions of law." Eggert v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28 % 37.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE IN INTERPRETING THE PARTIES' CONTRACT
It is undisputed that the court below found that the parties had a separate oral
agreement not expressed in their integrated contract and concluded that such separate
agreement was a part of their contract. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the parol
evidence rule. It is axiomatic that "[a] completely integrated agreement must be
interpreted on its face .. ." Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, ^|
28 (emphasis added).
While Nielsen argues that a fully integrated contract can be "supplemented" by the
addition of terms proved by extrinsic evidence, this argument finds no support in the law.
As the Utah Supreme Court has only recently held, resort to extrinsic evidence cannot be
used "for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract."
Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, UT 2008, ^J 10 (emphasis added).
In Tangren, the trial court admitted and considered extrinsic evidence regarding
the parties' intent in entering into a lease agreement which contained an express
integration clause specifying that the written lease was the entire agreement between the
parties. The Supreme Court held that consideration of such evidence in interpreting the
contract was error. "[W]e will not allow extrinsic evidence of a separate agreement to be
considered on the question of integration in the face of a clear integration clause." Id. at
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1113.
Nielsen suggests that parol evidence not inconsistent with a writing is admissible
to show what the parties' entire contract was, citing Novell Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc.,
2004 UT 162. The problem with this argument is that in the present case, unlike Novell,
the parties expressly agreed that their written contract constituted their entire agreement
"and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations,
understandings or Contracts between the parties." Exhibit 1, at % 14.
While Nielsen correctly notes that extrinsic evidence can be used to clarify
ambiguous terms of an integrated contract, Nielsen has not indentified any term of the
contract which is purportedly ambiguous and the court below identified none. Instead, he
simply asserts, without citation to any authority, that the written agreement is somehow
ambiguous because it is missing a term "essential to its performance." If subdividing of
the property was required before Nielsen could perform as promised, then it was his
obligation to do that which was required to allow him to satisfy his contractual obligation
to convey good and marketable title by warranty deed. See Kelly v. Leucadia Financial
Corp., 846 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1992).
Nielsen's argument that it would be illegal for him to convey the subject property
is of no moment. If his failure to subdivide the property prohibits him from complying
with his contractual promise, then the matter should be remanded for entry of judgment
for DCH and an award of its alternative remedy of damages. A seller who promises to
3

convey title, but cannot, is liable for damages. 71 Am.Jur.2d, Specific Performance § 233
(2d.ed.2001.)
With reference to Nielsen's suggestion that a court may consider extrinsic
evidence where the contract is "voidable for illegality" (Appellee's Brief at p. 23), it
should be noted that Nielsen never sought to have the contract voided, but instead
affirmed its validity, asserted that DCH had breached the contract and sought, and
received, attorneys fees pursuant to the purported terms of the agreement. The court
below did not rely on extrinsic evidence to avoid the parties' contract, rather it relied on
such evidence to add an extra term to the agreement, which is impermissible.
CONCLUSION
This is a very simple case. The parties executed a fully integrated contract for the
purchase and sale of real property. The trial court added a new term to their contract on
the basis of extrinsic evidence. The parol evidence rule prohibits a court from so doing.
Accordingly, the judgment below should be reversed and the matter remanded for entry of
judgment for DCH with instructions that DCH should be awarded its attorneys fees on
appeal and in the court below.
DATED this /WL

day of May, 2009.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By: PV.^a^^4c^^
M. David Eckersley
o^-—
Attorney for Appellant DCH Holdings, LLC
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